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Abstract
  Are non-attributive uses of ‘good’ meaningful? Judith Jarvis Thomson, in her book,  
Normativity, argues that such uses are not. I argue that Thomson is mistaken, but in a way 
which improves on her basic account of the evaluative and directive judgments central to 
normative thought. Relations among kinds, and not just relations between kinds and 
individuals, can be understood as ethically relevant. Such kind-kind relations can provide a 
semantic basis for non-attributive uses of good. 
 Accounting for such non-attributive uses allows Thomson to address three significant 
problems with her account. First, this account allows Thomson to make a more nuanced and 
charitable discussion of ethical realism and anti-realism. Second, this account provides a 
place in Thomson’s framework for ethically relevant distinctions such as intrinsic/extrinsic 
goodness, and moral/non-moral evaluation. Finally, this account provides Thomson the basis 
for resolving issues in her account of directives.
  Thomson account of directives such as ‘ought’ is defective in that the ‘ought’ of a 
more general kind eliminates that of a less general kind in cases of conflicting oughts. I 
demonstrate how such an account generates counter intuitive results and in fact undermines 
other parts of Thomson’s analysis. The kind-kind relations used in the account of non-
attributive uses of good also can be used by Thomson as the basis of a non-eliminative 
account of directives. Such relations account for why some ‘oughts’ have more weight than 
others. 
Michael Vossen
Philosophy 5495: Thesis
March 28, 2011
On Thomson’s Normativity 
 Judith Jarvis Thomson, in her book Normativity, extensively analyzes the evaluative 
judgments and directive judgments that the study of normativity consists in.1 Thomson 
defends the thesis that ‘good’ is attributive, and never predicative. In defending this thesis, 
Thomson follows Peter Geach, who in “Good and Evil” distinguishes between attributive and 
predicative terms. ‘Big’ is an attributive term. Attributive terms’ meaning varies by 
attribution. Predicative terms do not. Bigness in mice is different than bigness in animals. A 
big mouse is not a big animal. In such ways, the meaning of ‘big’ varies when attributed to 
mice and animals. In contrast,‘red’ is a predicative term. A red mouse is a red animal. The 
meaning of ‘red’ does not vary in the same way ‘big’ and ‘good’ do.
 This thesis has important consequences for how goodness is conceived. Holding that 
‘good’ is attributive and not predicative is to hold that the meaning of the term ‘good’ varies 
depending upon the kind of thing goodness is attributed to. There is not some one way in 
which a good book and a good mouse are good. So, when we say “Tom is good,” and we do 
not mean Tom is a good person, good at crossword puzzles, good to tease, good for a laugh, 
or other such expressions where Tom’s goodness is goodness in respect to some kind, then 
our utterance is meaningless. As Thomson writes: “In the end then, Geach was right: the 
philosopher who asks, “Is knowledge, or pleasure good?” is not asking an intelligible 
question...”2
 Thomson’s analysis suffers in three areas, despite explaining a broad variety of 
normative thought, avoiding appeal to metaphysically questionable entities others working in 
Geach’s tradition have appealed to, such as ‘natural-historical judgments,’ ‘life-forms’, and 
‘natural teleology,’ and providing a plausible basis for ethic’s objectivity.3 First, a variety of 
ethical realist and anti-realist positions are well-developed and have intuitive appeal, but do 
not seem to have a place in Thomson’s account. Second, some ethicists appeal to distinctions 
such as intrinsic and extrinsic goodness, or moral and non-moral evaluations. How these 
distinctions fit into Thomson’s account is mysterious. Her account is insufficient insofar as 
these distinctions are central to ethics. Third and finally, Thomson’s account of directives has 
substantial flaws, conflicts internally with her account of evaluative terms, and even conflicts 
with some of her own language.
 I will argue that these problems can be resolved satisfactorily. I will do this by 
showing how claims about predicative uses of ‘good’ can be reduced to claims about 
rankings of relations among the kinds which account for attributive uses, and thus show how 
Thomson’s analysis can be extended to address problems in these three areas. One need not 
choose between attributive and predicative accounts of ‘good.’ The concept of a kind central 
to Thomson’s account, in addition to analyzing attributive uses of good, can also effectively 
analyze predicative uses of good. As such, Thomson can preserve her basic position, 
including the claim that there is no first-order property goodness, while also providing a 
more nuanced discussion of the ethical realism and anti-realism debate, account for important 
ethical distinctions such as intrinsic/extrinsic and moral/non-moral, and resolve substantial 
problems in her account of directives.
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 What is the motivation for providing such an account? Some statements seem to 
involve both predicative and attributive goodness. In showing how an attributive account of 
goodness can account for claims about predicative goodness, this account will deal with 
statements such as “Bessy is a good bomb, but Bessy is not good” better than alternatives. On 
the one hand, “Bessy is not good” is meaningless on Thomson’s account, when the claim 
seems coherent.  On the other, accounts of predicative goodness have a hard time accounting 
for attributive goodness. If pleasure is good, are good thumbscrews ones that bring the least 
amount of suffering? No.4 In this way, other accounts of goodness are unattractive. This 
account provides a semantic basis for best understanding propositions involving both 
attributive and predicative goodness.
 Sometimes, a predicative accounts of goodness’ unattractive account of attributive 
good appears covered up by appeal to a distinction between “moral” and “non-moral” 
evaluation. This seems to fracture normativity rather than help explain the study. Further, this 
makes mysterious what evaluation is such that some evaluations are moral and others non-
moral. Accounting for the relations between predicative and attributive goodness will help 
de-mystify such claims, clarify the relation between “moral” and “non-moral” evaluation, 
and show how both are understood as evaluations.
 Finally, one criticism of normative virtue ethics is that such theories do not have a 
developed meta-ethics. This account helps provides the framework for understanding the 
meta-ethics of virtue theory by showing how the virtue ethicist’s appeal to human goodness 
conceptually relates to other normative positions. Likewise, a virtue ethic account benefits 
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from a clearer understanding of how meta-ethical positions on realism and anti-realism bare 
on claims about attributive goodness, as will next be discussed.
 My argument proceeds as follows. Section I. explains the difference between 
relations between a kind and an individual and relations among kinds. Two relations among 
kinds particularly relevant to ethical thinking are suggested, the “better to be” relation and 
the “essential” relation. Section II. explains and motivates the “better to be” relation. Section 
III. explains and motivates the “essential” relation. Section IV. discusses how predicative 
uses of ‘good’ can be accounted for by these two relations, and how to understand the 
relationship between attributive and predicative uses of good. This provides Thomson with a 
more charitable account of predicative goodness, and allows her position to address a larger 
variety of ethical views.
 Section V. considers the ethical and meta-ethical consequences of accounting for 
predicative uses of good this way by raising three questions regarding the “structure” such 
ranking of relations among kinds provides. The first question examined is whether this 
structure is based in reality or not. This question leads into a discussion on what this model of 
goodness implies about ethical realism and anti-realism. Section VI. explores a second 
question, what is the measure of such ranking? This brings out this model’s connections with 
ethical distinctions of intrinsic goodness and moral/non-moral evaluation. Sections V. and VI. 
provides Thomson with a more robust, nuanced, and charitable understanding of the ethical 
realism debate, and of the place of the discussed distinctions in ethics.
  Sections VII. examines a third question, what implications for evaluatives and 
directives this ranking has by bringing out problems with Thomson’s account of directives. 
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Section VIII. shows how such problems can be resolved by appeal to relations among kinds. 
This provides Thomson with a way to avoid substantial flaws and internal conflict in her 
account of directives, and provides a different understanding of ethical disagreement than 
Thomson’s. Finally, section IX. summarizes the arguments, and suggests how future research 
might better address issues raised here.
I. Two Relations Among Kinds
 Kinds play a central role in Thomson’s account. A good toaster is a toaster that has all 
the “virtues” of the kind toaster. Such a toaster is not defective in any way. What defect for 
members of kind consist in is determined by that kind. Likewise, kinds are what determine 
what individual’s falling under them ought to do. With qualification, Tom ought to Φ if Tom 
is of kind K, and if Tom does not Φ, then Tom is a defective K.5
 Relations between an individual and a kind are used by Thomson in this way to 
account for  numerous normative claims. Generally speaking then, claims regarding 
attributive goodness are analyzed as inferences from facts about kinds and facts about 
individuals.6 Thinking about goodness like this leads to questioning relations among kinds’ 
potential relevance. Here, we are not inquiring about the nature of the relation between 
individuals and kinds, such as whether the relation in one of instantiation, co-existence, or 
subsistence. Rather,  if terrier is one kind Fido is of, and quiet-dog another, we can wonder 
whether relations between the kinds terrier and quiet dog are also relevant in evaluating Fido. 
So, are there any reasons to think that relations among kinds are relevant to the study of 
normativity?7 
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 Yes. Two relations among kinds are particularly appropriate to consider. The first 
relation is noticed by considering whether there is an important respect in which some kinds 
are “better” than others. In particular, we will consider if there are reasons to think that it is 
better to be of certain kinds than to be of others. A notable relation comes from reflecting 
that, while many kinds may evaluate an individual, some kinds seem to better evaluate that 
individual than others, or seem to matter more than others in evaluating an individual. Thus, 
there is reason to think that as relations between kinds and individuals are significant for 
analyzing normativity, relations among kinds may likewise be significant.8
 Why focus on such kind-kind relations? Such relations may provide the basis for 
predicative uses of ‘good.’ Some ethical and meta-ethical claims seem to have no place in 
Thomson’s account, or turn out to be meaningless. Insofar as these claims can be reduced to 
claims regarding relations between kinds, Thomson then actually would have the means to 
address these positions. This is why we will now look at the two relations suggested in more 
detail, and show how such relations provide the basis for non-attributive uses of ‘good.’
 So, having distinguished between two different relationships kinds enter into, 
relationships between kinds and individuals, and relationships among kinds, we have isolated 
two at least prima facia ethically relevant relations. We have also seen how these relations 
contribute to the larger thesis of showing how Thomson’s account can analyze predicative 
uses of good. Theses relations will now be examined and motivated in more detail.
II. The “Better to be” Relation
“It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates 
dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.”
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 ~ John Stuart Mill
 One of the two relevant relations among kinds is what could be called the “better to 
be” relation. Predicative uses of good might be accounted for in terms of such a relation. 
Naming the relation the “better to be relation” is only meant to capture the sort of ranking 
among kinds this relation might give, and thus capture the sort of intuitions some ethicists 
appeal. The question of whether some kinds really are better to be than others is not intended 
to be settled here. How is this relation to be understood?
 First, “better” seems to be a relation in logical form. Some individuals are better than 
others in some respect. The faster runner is the better racer. Here, individuals can be 
compared as better in relation to each other in virtue of the kind racer. What about kinds? Is 
there a relevant respect for which kinds and not individuals are better than others?
 In his article “Good Period”, Richard Arneson raises a criticism that in a way draws 
attention to such a question. Arneson writes:
To claim that  pleasure is good simpliciter is to claim that if two possible states of the 
world are identical in all relevant respects except  that  in the second, some individual 
living being experiences some pleasure, then the second state of the world is better 
than the first. One could put the point by saying that pleasure has intrinsic value. 9
 
 What is compelling in Arneson’s criticism is that claims about goodness sometime are 
claims about that in virtue of what one thing is better than another. Further, Arneson’s 
suggestion that the notion of intrinsic value is connected with this understanding also is 
highly plausible. What is not compelling is his claim that pleasure is what makes some states 
of the world better than others.
 Thomson standard reply to such arguments is to point out that states of the world are 
like the kinds pebble and shade of gray, in that they do not generate standards for evaluation. 
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Asking whether A is better than B only makes sense if there is some respect in which A is 
better than B.10 Is there a respect in which something is a better state of the world than 
something else? Thomson argues that there is not. 
 Thomson’s standard reply is not entirely convincing. For in this matter, Thomson’s 
account of kinds seems to bias without argument one understanding of kinds against an 
equally coherent understanding.11 One instance of this bias is in her discussion of goodness-
fixing kinds. Thomson writes:
Isn’t  anything that consists in being a way the world might be, or being a suitably 
large state of affairs, as good a specimen of that  kind as any other? No less so than 
any pebble or smudge is as good a specimen of a pebble or a smudge as any other. I 
therefore invite the conclusion that there are no such properties as being (simply) a 
good act, event, fact, state of affairs, or possible world.12
 Here, Thomson suggests that states of the world are not the sort of thing such that one 
state can be a better than another as a state of the world. Thomson takes this to show that 
kinds such as this do not generate evaluative standards. This is meant to convince us that 
there are no good states of affairs. 
 Thomson’s critics are rightly critical of this position. For example, Nicholas Sturgeon 
writes of problems with Thomson’s account “One is why we should agree that neither 
possible state of affairs nor possible world is a goodness-fixing kind. I find that Thomson’s 
discussion leaves me less clear than I would like to be about how to tell which kinds are the 
goodness-fixing ones.”13 
 To expand on Surgeon’s concerns, consider: Why not conclude instead that all states 
of affairs are good states of affairs? Thomson’s discussion lacks a decisive reply. If goodness 
is conceived of as a lack of defect, and there are no ways for states of affairs to be defective, 
then any thing which is a state of affairs is a non-defective state of affairs. So, all states of 
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affairs are good. Thomson almost makes this point when she asks: “Isn’t anything that 
consists in being a way the world might be, or being a suitably large state of affairs, as good 
a specimen of that kind as any other?”14 So, why insist then that none are good? If a kind 
must allow for defective members in order for that kind to allow for non-defective members, 
then Thomson’s conclusion follows. Yet Thomson does not give us arguments why this is so.
 This alternate understanding is significant. Here, all ways the world might be are 
good. Part of Thomson’s argument against consequentialism is that worlds and states-of-
affairs are not the sort of things that can be good or bad. Does the alternate understanding 
undermine Thomson’s argument? Not in any substantial way. For if there is no way for a 
state of the world to be a defective or bad state of the world, then all states of the world are 
good states of the world. So, while on the one hand asking whether one state of the world is 
better than another makes sense in that states of the world do create evaluative standards, on 
the other hand, the standards are so thin that anything which is a state of the world is 
automatically a good state. Thus, asking whether one state of the world is better than another 
qua state of the world is pointless, since as states of the world they are all equally good.15
 For such reasons, asking whether one state of the world is better than another seems 
like the wrong approach for ranking kinds. Part of the reason why is that something’s being 
better with respects to being a state of affairs seems like the wrong respect. Is there a more 
appropriate respect? Plausibly yes. Being a member of some kinds is better than being a 
member of others.  As Mill suggests with his famous “It is better to be a human being 
dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied,” some 
things are perhaps just better to be.16 In this way, in addition to looking at kinds an individual 
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is of that provide standards for evaluation and proper action, we can also directly compare 
the kinds.
 In what way does asking whether kinds are better than each other with respect to 
being fit into Thomson’s account? Does the “better-than” relation even apply to kinds? 
Thomson’s account of the better-than relation seems to allow that the better-than relation can 
range over kinds, in that Thomson sees some sense in the question “Is Saint Francis better 
than chocolate?”17 Here, the “better than” relation ranges over an individual and a kind.
 For Thomson rejects the question as meaningless not concerning kinds being an 
inappropriate instance of the better than relation, but rather because the question does not 
specify some respect in which Saint Francis and chocolate are being compared or evaluated. 
Does the question “Is being a terrier better than being a quiet dog” share this defect? We 
might think no, for the relevant respect here is “being of” or “being.” Being a terrier could be 
better with respects to being than being a quiet dog.18
 Thomson also qualifies that the kind in respects to which an individual is being 
evaluated as better than another must be a goodness fixing kind. For this reason she writes: 
“So while there are such relations as being a better toaster, being a better seeing eye dog, and 
being a better beefsteak tomato, there are no such relations as being a better pebble, or being 
a better smudge.”19 Two difficulties emerge from this. First, are kinds even the sort of thing 
that can be of a goodness fixing kind? Second, is being even a goodness fixing kind, or is 
being like “pebble” or “smudge?”
 Thomson does not seem to specify in a sense of being of a kind which makes that 
kind’s evaluative standards applicable. Thomson’s examples seem to center on individuals 
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that are of a kind, things to which a name can refer. This object, Tim, is of the kind toaster. 
Tim is a toaster in the sense of being a token of the type toaster, or an instance of the kind 
toaster. Thomson’s lack of discussion of the metaphysics of kinds leaves unclear what to 
think of other examples. For, kinds also seem to be of kinds, in that terriers, dolphins and 
birds are kinds of mammals. Is the kind terrier of the kind mammal as Tim is of the kind 
toaster? That is, is the kind terrier an instance of the kind mammal? This seems to be a 
category mistake, for the kind terrier is not an individual like Tim.
 When kinds are of other kinds, are they too evaluated on standards given by good 
fixing kinds? This book is a sci-fi novel, but sci-fi novels are novels. So, sci-fi novel is a kind 
which is a sub-species of the kind nobel. In the way that an individual book is a good sci-fi 
novel based on  the standards of sci-fi novels, is the kind sci-fi novel a good kind of novel 
based on the standards of novels? That is, if sci-fi novel is a species of the genus novel, can 
the species sci-fi novel itself be defective, such that even the best sci-fi novel is a defective 
novel insofar as it is a sci-fi novel? Some people seem to take positions such as this in 
discussing literature, so we can at least represent the claim using kinds.
 Nothing Thomson argues seems to count against the position that relations obtain 
among kinds, nor is the position incoherent on the face of it. Distinguishing between how 
individuals are of a kind, and how kinds are of kinds might have some uses, but both ways of 
being of a kind allow good. So, these considerations do not seem to count against the “better 
to be” relation.
 Two replies seem relevant regarding the difficulty that being might not be a goodness 
fixing kind. First, note that Mill’s claim, that “it is better to be a human being dissatisfied 
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than a pig satisfied...” seems to be meaningful in a way that “This smudge is a better smudge 
than that smudge” is not. Mill seems to be claiming something that could be true or false, 
whereas the latter seems either false or nonsense. 
 Second, consider that we saw earlier that Thomson’s view on kinds like pebbles and 
smudges seemed to presuppose an account of what “being of a kind” is that prejudices 
without argument an alternative view. Namely, if defect and badness are privations, then 
kinds like pebble and smudges are just easy kinds to be excellent in. For if there is no way to 
be a defect pebble, then any pebble whatsoever is a good pebble. Likewise, any being 
whatsoever could be excellent being.
 So, the question “is it better to be evaluated favorably as a K than as a L,” and in 
general, “is it better to be a K than an L,” seems to be coherent and meaningful. As Arneson 
notes, there is a connection between pleasure being “intrinsically valuable”, and pleasure 
being that which makes certain things better than others. As such, Thomson’s account has 
room to address where certain notions of “intrinsic” value fit. The measure for which some 
kinds are better to be of than others is what is “intrinsically” valuable. Concern over what is 
intrinsically valuable is concern about a relation that holds between kinds, rather than the 
relation between kinds and individuals.  
 We have now examined the first of the two relations among kinds that may be used to 
account for predicative uses of ‘good.’ From Arneson’s reply, we have seen how rankings 
play a role in thinking about goodness. Kinds can be ranked. Some kinds are better to be of 
than others. In this way, relations among kinds may be reasonably considered relevant to 
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Thomson’s account. Next, another relation among kinds will be examined, the “essential” 
relation. Then, predicative uses of ‘good’ will be explained in therms of these relations. 
III. The “Essential” Relation
 The second of the two relations among kinds relevant to ethical analysis is what we 
might call the “essential” relation. As in the previous relation, this relation is here called the 
“essential” relation because of the relations analogy with certain appeals to essential 
properties in ethics. While looking at such examples helps see how such a relation functions, 
there is no argument here for thinking that only essential kinds bear this relation, or that 
indeed only essential kinds “matter more” in evaluating an individual than other kinds.
  The relation discussed in the previous section provided one way in which kinds can 
be ranked. The relation here will provide another. This understanding will then help in 
clarifying how predicative uses of good can be accounted for in terms of relations among 
kinds. 
 To get at this relation, consider: is a certain relation, a relation among the kinds which 
an individual is of, required for an evaluation grounded in a kind to be an evaluation of that 
individual? We can grant Thomson that kinds set standards for evaluation, and still ask who 
those standards evaluate. Just anything that is of the kind? Or are there some kinds that are 
the right kinds to consider in evaluating you?
 Here is a reason to think so. Suppose Dan is praised as a good date solely in virtue of 
his paying for expensive dinners. Does Dan rightly claim “You’re not evaluating me, you’re 
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just evaluating my pocketbook?”  If yes, then how an individual is related to some kind 
matters in evaluating the individual.
 Such examples suggest that evaluating an individual as a good K in virtue of meeting 
some standards for excellence in Ks fails in some circumstances.20 Those circumstances can 
be made more explicit. A simple starting point is where an individual is not of a kind K. 
Suppose Dan is not a pig, nor is Dan a dancer. Do evaluations of Dan as a K still evaluate 
Dan? One relevant distinction here is whether Dan could possibly be of that kind or not.
 For, let the name “Dan” refers rigidly to a particular human. Dan then could not be a 
pig and still be Dan. Suppose a virtue of pigs is having a large appetite. Dan has a large 
appetite, so is Dan a good pig? No, for Dan is not a pig. Would Dan be a good pig if he were 
a pig? Not if “Dan” refers rigidly to the particular human, for Dan could not be a pig and still 
be Dan. Thus, Dan having an attribute virtuous in a kind he could not be of neither makes 
him a good member of that kind, nor merely a potentially good member of that kind.
 In contrast, suppose that Dan is not a dancer, but could be of the kind dancer and still 
be Dan. Does Dan’s excellent balance and flexibility make him a good dancer, assuming 
balance and flexibility are virtues of dancers? Such cases are less clear.21 These 
circumstances at least make true the claim that Dan could be a good dancer, and so make true 
the claim that Dan is potentially a good dancer.
  We should be careful here though. Being a good dancer is more than potentially 
being a good dancer. Rather, the capacity to dance well needs to be acted on in order for Dan 
to be a good dancer. So while kinds that Dan does not belong to can evaluate Dan, the 
inference from facts about those kinds and facts about Dan is one of potentiality.
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 While these qualifications clarify, they do not capture what’s going in the date 
example. What is missing is that Dan is of the kind “date”, yet the kind does not truly 
evaluate Dan. If we think individuals can be of a kind, yet truly say that this kind does not 
evaluate them, then we should say that there is a distinction between when an individual is 
essentially of a kind, and when an individual not essentially of a kind. The kinds that really 
evaluate an individual are the kinds an individual is essentially related to, whereas those 
kinds that an individual is not essentially related to do not really evaluate that individual.
 Now, non-essential related kinds can either be understood as not at all evaluating 
Dan, or as evaluating Dan, but in a way that is lacking compared to evaluations of Dan qua 
his essential related kind. The evaluations of Dan in terms of non-essentially related kinds are 
not “true”, “authentic”, “real”, or “genuine” evaluations of Dan. Which way should we 
understand the example?
 The latter interpretation seems superior. While Dan’s language suggests that the kind 
“good date” does not evaluate him at all, we can understand this as exaggeration. 
Alternatively, such language can be understood as pointing out that, at some degree, 
evaluations of Dan based on non-essentially related kinds are or are like non-evaluations of 
Dan. 
 If we say that non-essential kinds do not evaluate Dan, then we are committed to the 
strong position that many evaluations which we normally would say are of us actually are 
not. While Dan is hesitant to say that the kind “good date” evaluates him, he is happy to say 
that the kind “engineer” evaluate him. If only Dan’s essentially related kinds truly evaluate 
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Dan, then we would also have to say that we are not evaluating Dan when we evaluate the 
engineer. This is too strong.
 So, rather than say that some evaluations are not evaluations of Dan at all, we should 
hold that some evaluations are better evaluations of Dan than others. Certain evaluations of 
Dan matter more in evaluating Dan than others. Being evaluated as a good payer of meals 
matters very little in evaluating Dan, yet being evaluated as a good engineer might matter 
very much. 
 In this way, the essential relation need not be very strongly committed to the 
evaluative importance of essential kinds. For the kind engineer is not a kind Dan essentially 
is, yet being an an engineer may matter more in evaluating Dan the the kind biped, which 
Dan essentially is. While there may be good reasons to take certain essential kinds as being 
the most important in evaluating Dan, and this understanding of a kind mattering more than 
another certainly makes sense of such essentialist intuitions, the important point to take away 
from these examples is ranking kinds by how well they evaluate an individual makes sense. 
So, some kind might not be one kind among many that equally well evaluates Dan, but the 
best kind for evaluating Dan. 
 We have now seen another way in which relations among kinds are relevant to ethical 
analysis. The first relation among kinds suggest that certain kinds are simply better to be than 
others. This second relation connects more closely with a notion of identity. Some kinds 
capture what Dan is more than others, and so evaluations of Dan based on kinds can be 
ranked as better or worse evaluations of Dan. These relations will now allow us to account 
for predicate uses of good, which will then provide Thomson the means to more robustly 
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address the ethical realism debate, make more sense of certain ethical distinctions place in 
her account, and finally to resolve serious issues with her account of directives.
IV. Predicative Uses of Good
 Relations among kinds provide the means to rank kinds in two ways. Some kinds are 
better to be than others, while some kinds better evaluate an individual than others. I will 
now make good on my thesis by showing that predicative uses of good can also be captured 
by Thomson’s account. 
  We are now in a position to see why Thomson is mistaken in denying predicative 
uses of good. There is a sense in which asking whether an individual is good is to ask about 
the individual’s relation to a kind. Another sense is to ask whether a certain relation pertains 
among kinds. For instance, consider the claim “Bessy is a good bomb, but Bessy is not 
good.” Is such a claim nonsense, or straightforwardly contradictory? 
 Thomson’s semantics for good suggests such a reading. For the second conjunct 
“Bessy is not good” appears to deny Bessy the property good, which Thomson denies there 
is.22 Thomson’s critics would be right to insist that the claim is not nonsense nor 
straightforwardly false. Does this force Thomson to admit goodness as a property? Yes, 
though not as the sort of first-order property Thomson is most concerned with. In this way, 
while Thomson is mistaken, she can also rightly claim that her critics are mistaken too.
 Distinguishing between between being good as a member of a kind, and kinds being 
better to be than each other allows for better interpretations of claims involving both 
attributive and predicative goodness. The claim “Bessy is a good bomb, but Bessy is not 
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good” can be understood as claiming that Bessy is perfectly attributively good qua bomb, but 
Bessy is of a kind that is low on the scale of kinds that are better to be.  Similarly, the 
essential relation allows for a sensible reading of the claim that “Dan is a good date, but Dan 
is not good.”  This can be understood as claiming that “date” is not the kind that truly 
evaluates Dan, and that Dan is actually defective in the appropriate kind despite his goodness 
as a date. Finally, the claim that “pleasure is good” can be understood as the claim that the 
capacity to produce pleasure is what makes the kind kitten, for example, better to be of than 
the kind bomb.23
 All this depends on there being relations among kinds that are relevant to the 
evaluations that relations between kinds and individuals give. Kinds bear relations to one 
another, as well as relations to individuals. Relations among kinds account for non-attributive 
uses of ‘good.’ The term ‘good’ can be used as a predicate to refer to the best kind. The term 
‘good’ can be used as a predicate to refer to the properties in virtue of which some kinds are 
better than others. The term ‘good” can be used as a predicate to refer to the kind that really 
evaluates an individual. These predicative uses of ‘good’ are not merely homonymous, but 
are grounded in the attributive use. They pick out kinds in virtue of those kinds bearing a 
certain relationship, or they pick out the property relevant to having this relationship.
  So, sometimes the term good is used with regards to whether a kind is of the better 
kinds to be of, and at other times with regards to whether a kind best evaluates an individual. 
Either way, the claim that “Bessy is good” or “Bessy is not good” implies nothing about 
Bessy’s attributive goodness. Bombs could be the best kind to be, or the worst, but whatever 
makes such claims true is only, at best, accidentally related to whether Bessy is a good bomb 
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or not. Thus, care needs to be given in arguments using the term ‘good’ to avoid equivocating  
over the two uses, and from drawing fallacious conclusions about one sense from the other.
 How are these uses related? I suggest that some uses of “good” are not attributive,  
but are non-coincidently homonyms with the attributive use. An apple does not have the 
property “is healthy” in addition to its chemical and biological properties, but rather an apple 
is truly said to be healthy in virtue to the apple’s relationship with human well-being. 
Similarly, Bessy is a good bomb, which is not good, not because Bessy lacks the property 
goodness, but because of bombs relation to that which is the best good. 
 Here is another way to understand this position. The proper predicative use of good is 
analogous to the proper predicative use of ‘exists.’ Just how we may deny that there is a first-
order property existence that all existing things have in addition to their other properties 
while allowing for a second-order property, the existence quantifier, so likewise we can deny 
that there is a first-order property goodness while allowing for a second-order property. So, 
there is both a sense in which Thomson is incorrect, in that the term good does seem to have 
a predicative uses, and correct, because there is no need for a special first-order goodness 
property, and because the predicative uses depends on the attributive use. The predicative 
uses make claims about the structure among kinds, and in doing so makes claims about the 
way attributive goods are related.24
  We have now seen how Thomson’s account can be extended to account for 
predicative uses of good using merely her basic notion of kind, and two relations among 
those kinds. Thomson now has a strong response to critics who see predicative uses of good, 
or distinctions built on predicative uses of good, as central to ethics. For Thomson can 
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assimilate such conceptions into her account, but her critics can less clearly assimilate 
Thomson’s points. We will now look at three areas where this conception of a predicative 
good improves Thomson’s account, the ethical realism debate, distinctions such as 
“intrinsically good,” and her own account of directives.
V. Implications of Structured Kinds
 How does our account of goodness improve Thomson’s account? We will now show 
how by focusing on issues the improved account clarifies. The ethical realism debate will be 
discussed first.
 If we allow that some claims about goodness are really claims about the structure 
kinds have, that is, how kinds are related to one another, then a number of ethical claims can 
be more charitably understood as claims about this structure. Sometimes when ethicists say 
“humans are good,” they could mean that “the kind human is a best kind to be.” Likewise, 
when the hedonist says “pleasure is good,” the hedonist is not talking nonsense, but is better 
understood as making a claim about that in virtue of which some kinds are better to be of 
than others. Further, certain ethical skepticism is not skepticism about there being “attributive 
good”, but about “moral good.” If the distinction between moral and non-moral good is a 
distinction between the best kinds to be, and the non-best, then such skepticism can be 
understood as claiming that there is no “better to be of” structure between kinds. Finally, 
realist and anti-realist positions in ethics could also be understood as positions on the 
measure for which some kinds are better to be than others.25 
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 For given that kinds can be ranked in respect to one kind’s being better to be than 
another, or with respect to how well the kind evaluates an individual, we may consider three 
important questions about such rankings:
 I. First, are such rankings based on the way the world is or not? That is, in claiming 
that it is better to be a human than to be a pig, are we making a claim about how the world is, 
a claim that is true or false based on facts about the world? Or, are such rankings not based in 
fact.
 II. Second, what is the measure for which kinds are ranked better or worse to be of? 
What specifically makes it true, if true, that it is better to be a human than to be a pig?
 III. Third, what do these rankings imply about the account of evaluation and action-
directing provided by Thomson? How is the relation between a kind’s “rank” and the 
evaluation and directives stemming from the kind to be understood?
 Such questions are the source of much meta-ethical debate. I will not attempt to give 
definitive answers to such questions here. Rather, I will consider how Thomson’s account 
broadens how we think about such questions. In doing so, Thomson can address more 
robustly and clearly issues like ethical realism, and distinctions in ethics like intrinsic 
goodness.
 Regarding the first question, we are asking if the structure that the better to be of 
relation gives to kinds grounded in the world or not? That is, if it is “better to be a human 
than to be a pig,” like Mill might claim, is this because some feature of reality makes one 
kind better than another? Or is this grounded in personal preference? Or the structure of the 
human mind? Or a cultural construction? Likewise, we can ask the same of the essential, 
non-essential relation.
 Whether grounded in reality or not, we should recognize that being able to ask such a 
questions means there are two ways in which an ethicist can be an ethical realist or an anti-
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realist. The debate over ethical realism is a debate on whether ethical claims are true or not. If 
true, what makes ethical claims true? If ethical claims are not true, are they false or 
meaningless? Distinguishing between attributive and predicative goodness in the way this 
account does adds another level to the discussion. For we can be an ethical realist or anti-
realist about attributive goodness given by kinds, and we can be an ethical realist or anti-
realist about predicative goodness given by the structure among kinds. 
 Ethical anti-realism about kinds may vary depending on the kinds discussed. One 
could hold that truths about “life-kinds”, such as the kinds snake, rabbit, and frog, may be 
grounded in features of the world, whereas fictional, artifact, and social kinds such as 
Hogwart’s wizards, toasters, and companies are not. Ethical anti-realism about the structure 
among kinds is skeptical of such structure’s nature. If we hold that being human is better than 
being a pig, are we right or wrong based on how reality is? Or does this merely express our 
own preference, or our culture’s preference? Likewise, existentialists can be interpreted as 
raising doubts to whether we are essentially related to some one kind.
 So, while we might agree with Thomson that the facts about kinds that give rise to 
attributive evaluation are objective, and are the sort of things science might answer, we could 
disagree on wether the “better to be of” relation is likewise objective. Care is thus needed in 
considering whether a meta-ethical claim or argument concerns the status of kinds that give 
rise to attributive goods, or concerns the structure among kinds. If this understanding of 
goodness is correct, then ethical and meta-ethical debate lacks clarity in ignoring this 
distinction. “Ethical claims are subjective” can concern the grounds for truths about kinds 
and the standards of excellence they provide, or what grounds one kind’s being better to be 
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than another. In clarifying which claim we aim at making, we can be clearer about what we 
are arguing for.
 Consider toasters as an example. Are truths about toasters grounded in the same way 
truths about cats are? We might think not. Our intentions and use may play a role in 
determining what the virtues of toasters are, and may not play a role in determining the 
virtues of cats. While defect is grounded in facts about kinds, what make those facts true may 
vary between kinds. So, on the level of attributive goods, that is regarding relations between 
kinds and individuals, some attributive goods might be said to be subjective and others 
objective.
 These claims about the subjectivity or objectivity of ethics are separate from claims 
regarding relations between kinds. While a toaster’s goodness may only be subjective in the 
sense just discussed, toasters in another sense may be objectively good. For the kind toaster 
may be the best kind to be, and we could claim that this is based in reality rather than 
preference. There really are, we may claim, some best kinds, and ranking among kinds is not 
based on personal preference. In logical space a toaster’s goodness may be subjective in that 
truth’s about toasters depended on human’s intentions, and objective in that there is a 
hierarchy of being in reality, and toasters are on top.
 This understanding of the ethical anti-realism debate clarifies criticisms of Thomson’s 
view, and brings out ways in which Thomson might reply. For instance, William FitzPatrick 
notes of anti-realists such as John Mackie that:
“What  he and others deny is that any of this helps to establish ethical realism, since 
they deny that there are any comparable objective and authoritative standards of 
excellence for human beings or persons as such.”26
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How should we understand this denial that the kind “human being”, or “persons” gives 
authoritative standards in the same way that “umbrella” and “toaster” do? Are such anti-
realists claiming that a certain proper subject of moral evaluation does not exist, although 
kinds that otherwise create standards for non-moral evaluation do? 
 If so, what is it do deny that a “proper subject of moral evaluation” exists? There is an 
obviously contradictory reading of this claim, namely that there is a kind K under which 
some evaluation is moral evaluation, and this kind does not exist. Perhaps this should be 
understood as a counterfactual claim, of the sort Kant may be making in his Groundworks. 
The only kind which is truly and without qualification good is the kind “rational-will,” but 
wheter we are rational-wills is not established. To say then that there is a proper subject of 
ethics and this kind does not exist is then to deny that we are rational-wills. 
 This interpretation has two significant problems. First, unless there were strong 
reasons to claim that evaluations of individuals under this kind matters more than evaluations 
of individuals under other “non-moral” kinds, then this anti-realist’s position has little bite. In 
other words, even if there does not exist some kind which we can be evaluated by, the anti-
realist has not given a compelling reason to think these “non-moral” evaluations are not 
under the purview of ethics except in name. So we aren’t rational wills, there are other kinds 
which can guide our actions.
 Second, what is it to deny that a kind exists? Denying that a kind exists is not merely 
to say that there are no present members of that kind. There are no Tyrannosaurus Rexes 
anymore, yet we can still know of the kind Tyrannosaurus Rex that they are carnivorous, 
sharp teethed, and two legged. While there are none now, we know the conditions for a 
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science-fiction genetic experiment to be successful in producing a non-defective specimen. 
Likewise, while “Nothing can be, as tablecloths go, good at doing crossword puzzles.” the 
fact that nothing could posses such an odd compound property is not for Thomson a reason to 
deny that there are such properties.27 As such, we might anticipate a similar reply regarding 
kinds from Thomson.
 So, again, the anti-realist’s claim should not be interpreted as there being a kind 
whose standards are the proper ones for moral evaluation, yet there is not this kind. Is such 
an anti-realist claiming that, like how Dan cannot be evaluated as a pig because he could not 
be one, that we cannot be evaluated under this proper kind because we cannot be of it? Yet 
this reply too is unsatisfactory, for in what sense is this kind then the proper kind for 
evaluating us?
 A more charitable reading understands the ethical anti-realist as in the position of 
denying the essential relation among kinds. Since this ethical anti-realist allows for non-
moral evaluation, the anti-realist must allow that some kinds do evaluate an individual. 
Rather than argue whether, say the kind human or the kind rational-will is the kind that best 
evaluates us, such an anti-realist would hold that no kind best evaluates us. So, whether we 
prefer positive evaluations as humans or as dates is merely a matter of preference.  
 This understanding of ethical anti-realist is of great interest. For this sort of ethical 
anti-realist is not necessarily saying anything incompatible with Thomson’s account. All 
claims about which kind best evaluates an individual may be false, yet numerous kinds may 
still evaluate the individual, just with no evaluation being a best one. Thomson’s account of 
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Normativity focuses on the way in which relations between kinds and individuals provides 
the basis for the latter sort of evaluation. 
 So here again, we have seen how relations among kinds, the relation of best 
evaluating an individual, provides a standard for ranking the evaluations given by kinds. 
Ethicist’s criticisms may sometimes be best understood as criticisms of this second standard, 
a standard which is significant in virtue of its relation to the primary standards given by 
kinds.
 Further, as we have seen, ethical anti-realism regarding the good predicates does not 
entail anti-realism about the attributive goods. The ranking of attributive goods might be 
based entirely on personal preference, or is just an expression of emotion. Even if a ranking 
of the kinds that have implications for member’s attributive goods is merely an expression of 
an individual’s emotions, there can still be a relation between such kind and members that 
makes true a member being a good member of that kind. So, while “Tom is a good assassin, 
but Tom is not good” in part could expresses the utter’s emotion, namely the conjunct “Tom 
is not good”, this is compatible with the conjunct “Tom is a good assassin” having a truth 
value. In these ways, if there is a distinction between the attributive uses of good and the 
predicative uses of good in the way suggested, then attention needs to be payed to the 
distinction in order to make clearer claims in ethics.
 We have now seen how this new account of predicative goodness provides Thomson 
with the means to make a more nuanced discussion of ethical topics. Particularly ethical 
realism. Next, we will look at how this account deals with intrinsic goodness, and the 
distinction between moral and non-moral evaluation.
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VI. The Measure of Rankings
 Another way this account of goodness improves Thomson’s account is by clarifying 
what to say about certain distinctions in ethics that some take as central to ethical practice. 
For some do not see a clear role for the notion of intrinsic goodness to fit into Thomson’s 
account, and in virtue of taking this notion to be central to ethics, would reject Thomson’s 
account for such a lack. We will now see how Thomson might respond better to such critics.
 Our second question regarding the “structure” of rankings of kinds was “what is the 
measure for which kinds are ranked better or worse to be of?” If it is better to be a human 
than to be a pig, what makes this the case? Likewise, what would make it the case that the 
kind human, and not the kind Kantian rational-will is what best evaluates an individual? 
Some distinctions about goodness can be said to be distinctions between these such 
properties, properties in virtue of which some kinds are better to be than others. For instance, 
there are a number of ways in which the claim that something is intrinsically good can be 
understood. Likewise, relations among kinds account for how the moral/non-moral 
evaluation distinction can be understood.
 First, the claim that some property or properties are intrinsically good could be the 
claim that these properties are the properties in virtue of which some kinds are better than 
others. Kinds can be compared as better or worse in virtue of other properties, but those 
properties only make kinds better or worse to be in relation to the intrinsic properties.
 A second notion of intrinsic goodness is determined by the standards for excellence a 
kind sets. For things which are not of that kind can contribute an individual of the kind 
meeting the standards, and so be good for Φ-ing, where Φ-ing is a virtue in the kind that the 
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thing is good for.  Thus, some things are extrinsically, or not intrinsically good. So a certain 
conception of intrinsic and extrinsic goodness is built into Thomson’s account, and each kind 
is in a sense “intrinsically good”, in that each kind sets standards for which things can be 
intrinsically or extrinsically good.
 For example, a campfire is external to a human, in that the campfire is not a human, 
nor part of a human. The warmth of the campfire contributes to the good of the human, in 
that the human’s good consist in having a certain internal temperature, which under certain 
circumstances the human could not reach without the fire’s assistance. This contrasts with the 
beating of a human heart, which causes blood to flow, for which the good of a human 
consists in. The heart’s beating is not extrinsically good for the human, but intrinsically is in 
part what goodness in humans consist in, or is at least, a requisite for human goodness.
 Similarly, the distinction some draw between moral and non-moral evaluation could 
be based on whether a kind has an “intrinsically good” property that makes the kind a better 
or best kind to be. If the distinction is drawn in this way though, then moral and non-moral 
evaluations are not then different in kind, such that to study moral evaluation is to study 
something fundamentally different from non-moral evaluation. For the content of moral and 
non-moral evaluation alike will be determined in the same way, by features of the kinds.
 This provides Thomson with a response to critics who suggest that Thomson ignores 
an important aspect of normativity in leaving mysterious as how distinctions such as “moral” 
and “non-moral” good, and “intrinsic” good fit into her account. Such mystery is what 
prompts critics such as William FitzPatrick to write:
Such thoughts are not shown to be unintelligible (or in need of reduction to something else) 
by noting that ‘good’ and ‘bad’ work as attributive adjectives when evaluating things as 
being excellent or defective of their kind. Thomson says a bit more here to support her claims, 
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but still gives short shrift to her opponents, broaching the topic of intrinsic goodness in a 
single footnote (16) and ultimately falling back on her claim already to have established that 
there is no such property as goodness (and hence no viable candidate for any proposed 
property that makes it the case that the things that possess it ought to be promoted).  Again, 
major points seem to go by too quickly here to have force against real opponents.28
 While we can agree with Thomson’s critics that showing how such distinctions fit 
into her account would be an improvement, we should not easily conclude that such 
distinctions have no place.29 For as we have now seen, there is room in Thomson’s account 
such distinctions, namely, as distinctions regarding relations between evaluative kinds.
 Distinguishing between arguments about the second-order predicate good, and the 
more fundamental attributive good also clarifies two kinds of ethical debates. Consider a 
substance dualist, and a materialist. The substance dualist says that what we really are is 
immaterial, whereas the materialist denies this. The debate between the dualist and the 
materialist can unfold in two ways. First, these two ethicists could be comparing two 
proposed kinds, and asking which kind really evaluates us. Here, the debate is over which 
kind best evaluates us, and so is a debate about the predication good. The materialist accepts 
the dualist’s understanding of a kind, say, the immaterial intellect, and the dualist accepts the 
materialist’s understanding of a kind, say, the human organism. The question here is “What 
kind are we, what kind best evaluates us?”
 This can be contrasted with another kind of debate. Here, these two ethicists agree 
that a certain kind, human, best evaluates us, but disagree about what is true of that kind. The 
materialist thinks humans are organic bodies, whereas the dualist thinks humans are 
immaterial intellects. The debate here is over what the virtues and defects of humans are. The 
dualist might hold that losing an arm is not really a defect of humans, that the most important 
defects are those of ignorance and unrestrained emotion, and so think that human wellbeing 
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is actually immune in important ways to chance and fortune. The materialist might take a 
broader view of what human defect consists in.
 Distinguishing between these two kinds of ethical debates is important. For there 
could be reasons to think one debate is more substantial than the other. On the one hand, we 
might think that the latter debate is merely a verbal dispute, in that what the ethicists are 
really arguing about is what the term ‘human’ should mean. If the dualist accepted the 
materialist’s criteria for defect as one definition of the kind human, and the materialist 
accepted the dualist’s criteria as another definition, then what seemed to be perhaps an 
epistemological problem how to know what human defect truly is transforms into the first 
sort of debate, which of these kinds best evaluates us.
 On the other hand, how we know some kind’s attributes could be a substantial 
question. Some kind’s attributes may be discovered by empirical process, as when the 
biologist makes discoveries about new species. Is this new species carnivorous or not? Is the 
behavior exhibited by a specimen normal, or are outside influences affecting the specimen’s 
behavior? Thus, in this way too, ethical debate can be clarified give our distinction between 
attributive and predicative uses of good.
 In the ways just discussed, Thomson can make use of our account of predicative 
goodness to show how some ethical distinctions can fit into her account. This provides 
Thomson with a good reply to critics. In our last sections we will turn to Thomson’s account 
of directives, show how her account faces significant problems, and finally show how those 
problems can be resolved.
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VII. Oughts in Virtue of a Kind
 Our account of predicative goodness provided Thomson with the means to address 
ethical topics more broadly, clearly, and convincingly. We will now consider what this 
conception of predicative goodness implies about directives.
 We asked earlier, if there is such a structure between kinds and between kinds and 
individuals, what does this imply about evaluatives and directives? Regarding evaluation, we 
have seen how an essential non-essential relation between kinds and an individual implies 
that some kinds best evaluate an individual, and other kinds only poorly evaluate an 
individual. The lack of such a relation need not be understood as implying that non-essential 
evaluations do not even evaluate.  
 We have also seen how the better-to-be relation can be thought of as ranking 
evaluations. If kind A is better to be than kind B, then being a good A is better to be than 
being a good B. What of directives such as ought, should and must? Does the good predicate 
have any implications for those?
 I will argue that there are implications, but that understanding the oughts generated by 
the best kinds to be of as eliminative of the oughts of the less best kinds is incompatible with 
understanding oughts as being generated from features of kinds. This recommends a non-
eliminative understanding of oughts. The non-eliminative understanding can say why the 
oughts of one kind have more weight over us than another, but not that such weight creates a 
non-relative ought.
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 A significant problem arises in Thomson’s discussion of directives, statements about 
what an individual ought, must, or should do. While Thomson in some ways recognizes this 
problem her account of kinds generates, her solution is unsatisfactory in a number of ways.
 Thomson’s account of directives is related to her account of kinds in the following 
way: When an individual ought to Φ what makes this true is that the individual is of a kind K 
such that not Φ-ing is a defect in K’s.30 What creates issues for this account is how to 
understand directives when the same individual is of multiple kinds. For this introduces the 
possibility that the same individual possibly both ought to Φ, in virtue of one kind, and ought 
not to Φ, in virtue of another kind. 
 Thomson explicitly considers such a scenario in her Fido example. Fido is a terrier 
advertised by a pet shop as a “quiet dog,” a dog whose vocal cords have been cut as to make 
the dog unable to bark. So, Fido is of two kinds, terrier and quiet dog. 
  If a quiet dog is able to bark, then that dog is a defective quiet dog. So, Fido ought to 
be unable to bark. Likewise, if a terrier is unable to bark, then that dog is a defective terrier. 
So, Fido ought to be able to bark. Thomson claims that an obviously untrue claim is that Fido 
both ought to be able to bark, and ought to be unable to bark.31 This problem motivates 
Thomson to introduce condition “gamma” for her account of directives.
 Is this really obviously untrue though? Since goodness is sensitive to what kind an 
individual is, why not oughts as well? Specifically, since these seemingly contradictory 
directives for Fido have different kinds as their sources, we ought to distinguish between 
what Fido ought to do qua quiet dog, and what Fido ought to do qua terrier. 
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 For, if Fido is able to bark when he ought not be able to bark, in virtue of being a 
quiet dog, Fido is not then defective as a terrier, but as a quiet dog. Likewise, if Fido is not 
able to bark when he ought to be able to bark, in virtue of being a terrier, Fido is not then 
defective as a quiet dog. So, a more nuanced position then would distinguish between what 
Fido ought, in virtue of being a terrier, to do, and what Fido ought, in virtue of being a quiet 
dog, to do. What is obviously false is that Fido ought, in virtue of being a terrier, to both be 
able and not be able to bark. 
 Thomson’s account of kinds prevents her from making this sort of response. For, as 
we will see, Thomson argues that oughts generated by a sub-kind are ‘trumped’ by the oughts 
generated by a more general kind in cases of conflict. For Thomson approaches the problem 
of conflicting oughts that is generated for an individual of different kinds in a somewhat 
unsatisfactory manner. Rather than distinguishing between what Fido ought to do qua terrier 
versus qua quiet dog, Thomson seems to think that there is a genuine contradiction, and that 
the contradiction arises because the weight of the ought given by the sub-kind quiet dog is 
treated as equal to the weight of the more general kind terrier. Thomson suggests that the 
weight of a more general ought overrides that of a particular ought in cases of conflict.32
 Why is this? Thomson writes:
When we reason about what a thing ought to do, we look for generalizations, 
and we take what issues from the more general to have more weight than what 
issues from the less general if what issues from the more general conflicts 
with what issues from the less general.33
 This motivates Thomson to add the condition “There is no directive kind K+ such that 
K is a sub-kind of K+, and such that if a K+ does V, then it is a defective K+.”34
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 While Thomson may ultimately be correct in that a principle is required for deciding 
what to do when an individual is of multiple kinds which generate conflicting directives, 
Thomson’s gamma condition is too hasty. Always appealing to the more general kind in cases 
of conflict leads to implausible results.
 For consider something like a “Cambridge” kind. Take the Cambridge kind ‘existents 
that do not bark’ and call them “Borks.” Since Fido had his vocal cords cut, he does not bark, 
and so is a “Bork.” Bork is more general than the kind terrier,  so by Thomson’s own gamma 
condition, Fido ought not bark after all. So, this ought has more weight in directing Fido than 
oughts given by the kind terrier. Virtually all kinds can be trumped by some more general 
Cambridge kind.
 The kind Bork is clearly too sparse for guiding Fido on how to have a full life. What 
should Fido eat, should Fido chase cats, and should Fido have a tail or not? Nothing about 
the kind Bork meaningfully answers these questions. Appeals to more general kinds thus are 
not always appropriate for determining what an individual ought to do in cases of conflict.
 Now, while the kind “Bork” is in a sense artificial, in that the kind does not carve 
reality up into classes we think reality is carved into, this artificiality should be no restriction 
on whether “Bork” is an evaluative kind or not. For Thomson places no emphasis on kinds 
found in nature being the only kinds which give real evaluative standards, since toasters 
equally create standards for goodness in toasters. So, if the artificiality of the example strikes 
us as counting against it, then this is symptomatic of Thomson’s account which is itself 
promiscuous about what counts as a kind, and not merely a bad counterexample.
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 Further, the general problem of kinds generating conflicting oughts for an individual 
arises because the same individual can be of multiple kinds. However, when an individual is 
of multiple kinds, the relation between the kinds is not necessarily that between kind and sub-
kind. At least, Thomson has given us no reason to think that kind-subkind relations exhausts 
how individuals are of multiple kinds. 
 Here is a way an individual might be of multiple kinds, while the kinds are not sub-
kinds. Call the object before me Pup. Pup seems to be of the kind paperweight and of the 
kind cup. Paperweights are not sub-kinds of cups, nor cups a sub-kind of paperweight. So 
Pup can be evaluated as defective qua paperweight, or defective qua cup, and so the oughts 
of both cups and paperweights apply to Pup. Here, no kind-subkind relation is involved, and 
yet the oughts of such different kinds potentially make it such that the same individual ought 
to both Q and not Q.35
 Have these arguments shown that Thomson should consider oughts as kind-related in 
the same way defect and virtue is? Not entirely. For, depending on the questions we take 
ethics to be able to answer, such a position seems unable satisfactorily to answer ethical 
questions. We might rightly expect ethics to explain why we ought not murder. One kind of 
explanation we might expect ethics to give then is an explanation of why Dexter ought to act 
how a human ought to act rather than how a murderer ought to act. But if our argument’s 
against gamma are successful, the we might wonder if Thomson’s account has the resources 
to give such an explanation.
 Why? Either oughts are kind-related, such that possibly the same individual ought to 
Φ in virtue of being a K, and ought not Φ in virtue of being a L, or oughts are not. Suppose 
Vossen  37
that they are ought-related. Thomson holds that what would make the statement “Dexter 
ought to murder” true is that Dexter is of a kind where not murdering is a defect. Suppose not 
murdering is a defect in the kind murderer, and murdering is a defect in the kind human. 
Then, Dexter in virtue of being a murderer, ought to murder, and, in virtue of being a human, 
ought not to murder. 
 So, we can in one sense explain why Dexter ought not murder, in that we can explain 
why, in virtue of being human, he ought not to murder. Such an explanation does not explain 
why, in virtue of being a murderer, he ought not to murder. Further, given that Dexter cannot 
both murder and not murder, we may be tempted to reply “I see that he ought to murder qua 
murderer, and ought not to murder qua human, but what ought he do!?” Such a question can 
be understood as a question of what to be. Ought I be a human, and be sensitive to the 
standards generated by the human kind, or ought I be a murderer, and be sensitive to the 
standards of the murderer kind?  
 If this question is meaningful and has an answer, then there are true ‘ought’ 
statements settled not by an appeal to the standards for defect given by kinds.36 For it is not 
by the standards of the kinds murderer and human that Dexter ought to be a human, but 
rather in virtue of something like Thomson’s gamma condition.
 So, then should something gamma-like be adopted? By no means. For any position 
where the ought’s generated by one kind eliminate the oughts of another kind will create a 
serious problem for Thomson’s view that kinds are what provide the standards for goodness 
and defect. For suppose oughts are not kind-related. That is, if an individual is of two kinds, 
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then the oughts are not merely in virtue of the kind. This position is incompatible with the 
view that kinds are what provide standards for defect.
 To see how, consider the following. Suppose that Tom is a human and an assassin, 
and further for the sake of argument grant that assassin is a sub-kind of human. Now, in 
virtue of facts about humans, let us say that it is false that Tom ought to kill stealthily. By 
Thomson’s criteria we seem committed to the view that killing stealthily is not a defect in 
assassins! For if it is not the case that Tom ought to kill stealthily, then either Tom is not an 
assassin, or it is not the case that if an assassin does not kill stealthily, then the assassin is 
defective. Since Tom is an assassin, we are left with the latter. So, from the fact that it is not 
the case that Tom ought to kill stealthily, and that Tom is an assassin, we can conclude that 
not killing stealthily is not, in fact, a defect in assassins!37
 Anytime an individual is of multiple kinds, and the oughts of one kind eliminate the 
oughts of another, a simple application of modus tollens will provide the conclusion that the 
supposed conflict of oughts is illusionary. What we think is a defect in the kind whose ought 
is eliminated will turn out not to be a defect.38
 Further, the motivation for introducing conditions like Gamma in the first place was 
that they provided an answer to what an individual ought to do in cases of conflict between 
different oughts. Such conditions as a solution goes against the very motivation for 
introducing them, for based on the truth of such conditions, we should deny that there even 
was a conflict of oughts.
 Likewise, if it were true that “Dexter ought to be a human rather than a murderer”, we 
still might think that even though Dexter is wrong to be a murderer, the kind murderer still 
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provides criteria for what excellent murdering consists in. “I don’t care that I ought not be a 
murderer, given that I am a murderer, how do I do it well?” We can still recognize what 
excellence and deficiency in a despicable kind is, even though no one would recommend 
pursuing such excellence.
 So, we have now seen how Thomson’s account of directives faces serious problems. 
Gamma has counter intuitive results, and internally conflicts with Thomson’s account of 
evaluatives because a less general, eliminated kind’s defects are made non-defects by her 
conditions. We will now see how such problems can be resolved using the account of 
predicative goodness I argue for.
VIII.Against Eliminative Oughts
 We have seen how relations among kind are significant to ethical thought. We will  
now see how in particular these relations are relevant to judgments about what we ought to 
do. This understanding of how relations are relevant provides Thomson the means to avoid 
the problems drawn out in the previous section.
 Let us return to the reply: “I see that he ought to murder qua murderer, and ought not 
to murder qua human, but what ought he do” and ask, is this question meaningful? Thomson 
denies that statements using good as a property are meaningful. So, why not deny that there 
are such ‘oughts’ as asked for in the question, by insisting that oughts only get meaning in 
virtue of kinds?39 
 A reason for hesitating is that, while the question of what he ‘ought to do,’ where the 
ought is not in virtue of some kind, is illformed, perhaps this is just a poorly phrased version 
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of a different meaningful question. For surely there is some relation between being a murder 
and being a human that counts in favor of being a human.
 We have seen that the notion of ‘trumping’ oughts, where trumping involves the 
elimination of the trumped ought, generates the unsatisfactory conclusion that non-stealthy 
killing is not in fact a defect of assassins, because it is false that a human who is an assassin 
ought to kill stealthily. Yet there could still be a non-eliminative relation between the oughts 
that counts in favor of human oughts.
 A meaningful question in the spirit of the first is “why is it better to be a human than 
to be a murderer?” For, being evaluated positively as a human may matter more than being 
evaluated positively as a murderer.  Further, Thomson writes:
When we reason about what  a thing ought  to do, we look for generalizations, and we 
take what issues from the more general to have more weight than what  issues from 
the less general if what issues from the more general conflicts with what  issues from 
the less general.40
 Here, Thomson speaks of “weight.” In weighing though, the two-pound weight is not 
eliminated, does not count for nothing, because the four-pound weight is greater. If this 
statement speaks closer to Thomson’s motivation for Gamma, then Thomson should embrace 
the non-eliminative interpretation.
 For such reasons, this understanding of the relation between kinds and directives 
seems superior to the understanding presented by Thomson, and is possibly a better way of 
presenting Thomson’s own view. Further, we already have a good way to understand such 
“weight.” Relations between kinds can explain different senses in which some “oughts” are 
more weighty than others. One reason why the “oughts” of humans seem like the oughts 
Dexter should care about could be because the oughts of humans are what really evaluates 
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Dexter. The evaluations of Dexter as a human have more weight in evaluating Dexter than 
others. Another reason could be because being a human is better than being a murderer. So, 
being a good human is better than being a good murderer, and “weighs” more in deliberation 
of what to do.
 Now, such weights should be approached carefully. For if being a god is better than 
being human, what, if anything, does this imply about how humans are evaluated and advised 
to act? Knowing what is best to be does not necessarily speak to how we imperfect beings 
ought to live, which may more appropriately answered by facts about a more imperfect kind. 
 Similarly, if the answer to the question “why prefer the better to the worse?” is 
because you are defective in some way by preferring the worse, then that defect is 
presumably grounded in the truth about some kind. Then again, what you ought to do is again 
ultimately grounded in the kind you are. Because I am a human, and a defect in humans is to 
be irrational, I should follow the best kind’s oughts? If that is ultimately the way facts about 
what kinds are better apply to action, then we see again that the good of attribution is more 
fundamental than the good of betterness in being. 
IX. Conclusion
 Are non-attributive uses of ‘good’ meaningful? Judith Jarvis Thomson, in her book,  
Normativity, argues that such uses are not. I have argued that Thomson is mistaken, but in a 
way which improves on her basic account of the evaluative and directive judgments central 
to normative thought. Relations among kinds, and not just relations between kinds and 
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individuals, are ethically relevant. Such kind-kind relations provide a semantic basis for non-
attributive uses of good. 
 Accounting for such non-attributive uses allows Thomson to address three significant 
problems with her account. First, this account allows Thomson to make a more nuanced and 
charitable discussion of ethical realism and anti-realism. Second, this account provides a 
place in Thomson’s framework for ethically relevant distinctions such as intrinsic/extrinsic 
goodness, and moral/non-moral evaluation. Finally, this account provides Thomson the basis 
for resolving issues with her account of directives.
  Thomson account of directives such as ‘ought’ is defective in that the ‘ought’ of a 
more general kind eliminates that of a less general kind in cases of conflicting oughts. I 
demonstrated how such an account generates counter intuitive results and in fact undermines 
other parts of Thomson’s analysis. The kind-kind relations used in the account of non-
attributive uses of good can be used by Thomson as the basis of a non-eliminative account of 
directives. Such relations account for why some ‘oughts’ have more weight than others. 
 This account raises some interesting areas for future research. Given this 
understanding of the relation between predicative and attributive goods, we might check if 
critical issues in ethics make faulty inferences from one meaning of good to another. I have 
explained how truths about life, artifact, fictional, and social kinds may be made true in 
different ways, and in this area too an account of kinds can be further developed.41 The 
content of a kind relevant to us needs to be argued for, as well as which understanding of the 
better to be and essential relations is correct. Finally, I have for the most part avoided 
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discussing Thomson’s views on rationality, but some account of the connections between 
ethics and rationality should be developed.
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1 Evaluatives cover claims such as “Fido is a good dog,” whereas directives cover claims such as “Fido ought to 
bark.”
2 Normativity, pg. 17
3 See Phillipa Foot’s Natural Goodness, and Michael Thompson’s Life and Action.
4 This is not to say that thumbscrews are good, but to note that a standard for excellence in the kind thumbscrew is 
pain-production. Good thumbscrews are painful. As will be made more clear, there is still room to coherently hold 
that “if pain is bad, then good thumbscrews are bad.”
Likewise, there is room to coherently hold “bad movies are good.” These claims involve an ascription of predicative 
goodness or non-goodness to attributive good or not good. These should not be confused with the contradictory “bad 
movies are good movies” and “good thumbscrews are bad thumbscrews.”
5 Normativity, pgs.19, 21, 28, 60, 71, 207-213.
6 See Life and Action, pgs. 80-81
7 In fact, Thomson’s Gamma condition can be understood as claiming that the “more general” relation between 
kinds matters for determining what directives apply to an individual who is of multiple kinds. See Normativity, 
pgs. 207-213
8 I will refer to relations between kinds and kinds as kind-kind relations for brevity when appropriate.
9 Richard J. Arneson, “Good period”
10 Normativity, pgs. 59-60
11 Here is another instance where an alternate understanding of kinds may be equally appropriate to Thomson’s. 
Thomson argues that “being a k” is not a virtue of K’s, writing: 
 What I have in mind is that accepting it commits us to the conclusion that 
 being a  carving knife is a virtue in a carving knife. For (i) the kind carving
  knife is a goodness-fixing kind, and (ii) a carving knife is a good carving 
 knife only if it has being a carving knife. But that conclusion can hardly be right.
 Two replies come to mind. First, the feature “being a K” is one virtue any K, no matter how else 
defective, has. Any K has some worth insofar as the individual is a K. This reply would help connect Thomson’s 
account of goodness with elements of the Kantian tradition. Merely being human makes any human, no matter 
how flawed, good in some way. So, any act respectful to the human good cannot ignore a human’s humanity. 
The feature of “being a K” then is not unimportant in that the feature accounts for any K’s minimal worth.
 Second, why can’t “being a K” be understood a sort of “master virtue”, or the whole of virtue in K’s 
that other features are merely a part of, or aim towards? What is the relation between the virtues “having four 
legs”, “eating grain”, and “having a mane?” The are all part of what it is to “be a horse.”, and each feature 
specifies more specifically what such being consists in. 
 Understanding “being a K” as the whole for which features like “having four legs” and “eating grain” 
are parts of, there is then a sense in which an individual K can fail to “be a K.” An individual’s defects are 
failings to fully “be a K.” If “being a horse” consists partially in “having four legs”, then a three-legged horse 
fails to fully “be a horse.” This way of speaking is in line with how we talk. For of tyrannical and merciless acts, 
we say that the man committing them “is not human.” By this we are saying that the man lacks virtue. So, here 
again Thomson seems to be making claims with important ethical import and based in an understanding of what 
kinds and their features are without fully considering alternate understandings of kinds.
12 Normativity, pg. 26
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13 “Normativity”, article by Nicholas Sturgeon, pg 748.
14 Normativity, pg. 26, my emphasis.
15 Although not equally good for, but this is no problem, since good for uses another kind than state of the world 
as the standard for evaluation.
16 Socrates could not be a pig and be Socrates. Socrates is essentially a human. So, how is it better to be Socrates 
than to be a pig? One reply to this worry is that we might rely on some “measure” for betterness in being. For 
instance, we could hold that kinds that have a greater capacity for pleasure are better to be than kinds with a lesser 
capacity for pleasure. In this way, although Socrates could not be a pig, in virtue of a human’s capacity for pleasure 
we could still make sense of Socrates being better to be than a pig.
Regarding my discussion of attributive and predicative goodness, some defects in humans may also affect a human’s 
capacity for pleasure. In that case, there is a question of whether its better to be a bad human than to be say a good 
pig. Does merely having a greater capacity make one being more good than another, or does that capacity need to be 
realized? In this way, change in one’s attributive goodness might sometimes also change one’s predicative goodness.
17 Normativity, pg. 59-60
 18  How to understand being is a tricky metaphysical question. If being is understood thinly, in the sense 
that things either exist or they do not, then rank of kinds based on which is better to be will be likewise thin. All real 
kinds are of equal rank. This does not pose a particular problem for the semantics of the predicate good I suggest, for 
then the predicative term ‘good’ still has some meaning, just not a meaning that would get us far in understanding 
conflicts of attributive goods.
On the other hand, the history of philosophy is full of theorists who have special views on how to understand being, 
existence, and realness. The ‘better to be’ relation helps capture how these views could bare on ethical thought, and 
helps explain the connection between our understanding of being and our understanding of goodness.
19 Normativity, pg. 60
20 Where K is some kind.
21 Alternatively, Dan is a good dancer but just does not know it?
22 Normativity, pg. 17
23  This does appear to require treating ethicist’s claims that “pleasure is good” as holding something like, “the 
capacity to produce pleasure” or “the capacity to experience pleasure.” This account thus may not entirely capture 
the position of ethicist’s who think pleasure is simply good. Whether this shows that my account is limited to a 
certain variety of ethical claims, fails to capture an essential feature of ethics, or shows that thought that pleasure is 
simply good is confused is a matter that would need to be worked out in more detail.
24  This also is useful in dealing with error theorists such as Mackie, who are concerned with the “weirdness” of 
ethical properties. In holding the predicative goodness is properly speaking a second-order property, some criticism 
about goodness as a property can be side-stepped.
25 And likewise for claims on what kind best evaluates an individual.
26 See William FitzPatrick’s book review.
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27 Thomson writes: “Nothing can be good at doing crossword puzzles for a tablecloth-- nothing can be, as 
tablecloths go, good at doing crossword puzzles...Similarly for the others on the list. But that isn’t a good reason 
for rejecting them. For there are such properties as being a tablecloth and being good at doing crossword 
puzzles. As I said in the preceding section, if being F and being G are properties, then there is a compound 
property being both F and G.”  Normativity, pg. 29
Also, Thomson seems neutral in general about how metaphysically we should understand kinds. But this may 
be an area where more robust accounts of the nature of kinds differ in reply. Saul Kripke, for instance, would 
likely deny that there is a kind unicorn, while those working more in the Russelian tradition might not. (See pg.
157 of Naming and Necessity) What does Thomson think about unicorns? Is a kind needed as a prerequisite for 
either denying or confirming the existence of entities of that kind? How to think of a kind’s existence and non-
existence is not entirely clear.
28 See William FitzPatrick’s book review.
29 See William FitzPatrick’s book review.
30 Normativity, pg. 207-208
31 Normativity, pg. 211-212
32  Normativity, pg. 210-212
Thomson writes: “I take K to be a sub-kind of K+ just in case necessarily, every K is a K+”
 Thomson claims that the fact that an individual is of a more particular sub-kind guarantees that the 
individual is in some way defective, whereas the individual being of a more general kind does not. Perhaps the 
concern here is that, for some kinds, an individual would necessarily be defective.
 If Thomson’s metaphysics of kinds is generous with what kinds there are, then surely there will be 
some kinds an individual is of that an individual can’t help but be defective in. M’s live on earth and have green 
eyes, N’s live on earth and have blue eyes, and O’s live on earth and have brown eyes. Now, any human can’t 
help but be a defective M, N, or O. We only have so many eyes. So, there is some kind M, N, or O of which we 
are defective. Where Thomson’s concern seems accurate is on the weight such kinds have on evaluationing us 
and guiding our actions.
  Must there always be a way to act such that one can avoid defect? Goodness might be fragile. Getting 
into conflicts in which defect in some kind can’t be avoided is easy, and reality requires us to make sacrifices 
which undermine living perfectly as some kind.
33 Normativity, pg. 212. Roughly, the fact that an individual is of a more particular sub-kind guarantees that the 
individual is in some way defective, whereas the individual being of a more general kind does not.
34 Normativity, pg. 212
35 Another way to describe the Pup example is to say that there is no kind that is essentially what Pup is. 
Consider now Tom, who is a human and an assassin. Now, assassin does not appear to be a sub-kind of human, 
for martians could equally well be assassins. So conflict between oughts generated from being of different kinds 
arises equally well in the case where an individual could be said to be essentially of one kind, and not 
essentially of the other.
Perhaps something of a response can be made to the Pup example by denying that Pup is of the kind 
paperweight and the kind cup in the same way. Perhaps Pup’s creators intentions make it such that Pup is of the 
kind cup, even though Pup can be used for the purposes of paperweights. Holding such is to hold that certain 
conditions make it such at an individual is of one kind and not another. Such conditions might very well vary 
between kinds of kinds. A creator’s intentions might very well be what makes Pup primarily a cup, and yet a 
creator’s intentions needn’t make James of the kind pianist rather than the kind game-designer. Saying clearly 
what these conditions are, and what grounds these conditions is a way Thomson and working in her framework 
could bolster her account of kinds as to better deal with such problem cases.
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36  Now, the ought could just be understood as generated by the kind human. In that case though, what we seem 
to be saying is that “A ought, in virtue of being a human, be a good human rather than a good assassin.” This is 
compatible with “A ought, in virtue of being an assassin, be a good assassin rather than be a good human.”  
though. Being a good assassin gets in the way of being a good human, and vice versa, so insofar as you are a 
human or an assassin, you should abandon the other.
37  I.e.:
A: Tom is a K
B: If K’s not L, then defective K. (equivalently: K is L or defective K)
C: Tom ought to L
A&B-->C, and C is false because C is trumped by a more general kind. So by Modus Tollens, not A or not B. 
Consider not A. Tom is a K by default, by the way the example is set up, so not not A. Therefore, not B. So, not 
the case that if K’s are not L, then defective K.
38 Likewise, while deriving an ‘oughts’ from an ‘is’ is only debatably a fallacy, surely no one thinks ‘is’ is 
derivable from ‘ought.’ Yet from the negation of an ought, we can derive that an attribute is not a defect of a 
kind.
39  As we noted earlier, the questions seems to be a question of what someone should be. Do oughts really apply 
to being in addition to action? A reason for holding the question meaningless then is that oughts range over 
action and kind-states, and that to extend oughts further .. is a category mistake?
40 Normativity, pg. 220
41 The works of Phillipa Foot and Michael Thompson can perhaps be read as developing such an account for life-
kinds.
